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Roy A. Wise 
National Institute on Drug Abuse, 
NIH 
The aim of scientific explanation is to characterize the important an-
tecedents of observable (or at least objectively confirmable) events. 
Explanations of behavior in terms of motivational states are appeals 
to unobservable, internal events for interpretations of behavior that 
is variable under apparently constant external stimulus conditions 
(see, e.g., Brown, 1953; Hinde, 1960). To be identified as the cause 
of a behavior, the unobservable event or condition must preexist the 
behavioral event to be explained. A behavior cannot be explained by 
its consequences, though it may be explained as a consequence of 
similar events in the animal's history. Scientific explanation involves 
the sequential identification of what comes first and what follows. To 
understand correctly what comes first and what follows is to achieve 
the primary goal of science. 
While the teleology of Aristotle's notion of "final causes" encour-
aged the explanation of what comes first by what comes after, the ma-
jor advance of the scientific revolution was to substitute mechanical 
causes-necessary and sufficient conditions (the "efficient causes" of 
Aristotle)-for the "final causes II previously legitimized by Aristo-
tle's teachings (see Aristotle, Physics, in Barnes, 1984). Galileo precip-
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itated the culling of Aristotelean teleology from physics; we no longer 
accept Aristotle's notion that heavy things fall faster than light ones 
or his teleological suggestion that they do so "in order to reach their 
natural place." Two centuries after Galileo, Darwin (1859) offered a 
nonteleological explanation for human evolution; his principles of 
random mutation and natural selection offered a mechanistic alter-
native to the Aristotelean notion that human evolution was partly 
determined by the goal or intention of a creator. Skinner's (1966) par-
allel suggestion that behavior is generated randomly and selected by 
its consequences was an attempt to go beyond the rigidity of reflexes 
while avoiding the teleology inherent in the notion of goal direction. 
The apparent goal direction of motivated behavior explains nothing; 
it is the mystery that remains to be explained. 
The problem of teleology is the problem of suggesting a conse-
quence-something that follows-as the explanation of its cause-
something that came first. A major challenge for psychology is to 
find mechanistic alternatives to teleological explanations of behavior. 
For psychology to advance our understanding of behavior within the 
scientific paradigm it must find the efficient causes-the necessary 
and sufficient antedating conditions-for behaviors that appear to 
be controlled by their consequences. This was really the quest of 
Skinner: the explanation of a given act in terms of its reinforcement 
history rather than in terms of the animal's presumed intentions. 
In no sphere of psychology is the temptation to explain an act by 
its intended consequences stronger than in the field of motivation. 
Eating is "explained" with the notion that it satisfies the bodily need 
for energy repletion; sexual behavior is "explained" with the notion 
that it satisfies the need of the species (or the "need" of the gene) 
for reproduction. The implication is that sex is initiated in order to 
reproduce the species and that eating is initiated in order to replenish 
energy reserves. These are Aristotelian-teleological-explanations. 
They do not advance our understanding. The task is to impose the 
step-by-step analysis of linear thinking-the efficient causes of Aris-
totle (what comes first and what follows)-on the cycles of hunger 
and satiety that offer our dominant model of motivation. 
The Problem of Definition 
As can be seen from a survey of articles from the Nebraska Symposia 
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of years past, there has never been an adequate scientific definition 
of motivation. As Beach (1956) once noted on a related topic, "Most 
writers are satisfied to begin with the uncritical assumption of a mu-
tual understanding between their readers and themselves"(p. 1). Not 
even in undergraduate textbooks can we find a definition that clearly 
differentiates motivational from nonmotivational phenomena. Jones, 
in introducing this symposium in 1955, identified the problem of mo-
tivation as the problem of "how behavior gets started, is energized, 
is sustained, is directed, is stopped, and what kind of subjective re-
action is present in the organism while all this is going on" (p. vii). 
Jones has reserved the whole field of psychology for the motivational 
specialist. His statement gives us little insight as to an exclusionary 
rule; what does not fall under the rubric of motivation? In Beck's 
(1978) text the following was offered in place of a definition: "Moti-
vation is broadly concerned with the contemporary determinants of 
choice (direction), persistence, and vigor of goal-directed behavior" 
(p. 24). Beck acknowledged that this is not a definition, apologizing 
that we cannot "just define motivation; we define a set of variables 
that are called motivational" (p. 25). The problem, not solved by 
Beck, is to define the set of such variables in such a way as to define 
equally the set of nonmotivational variables. Petri's (1981) popular 
textbook suggests that motivation is "the concept we use when we 
describe the forces acting on or within an organism to initiate and 
direct behavior" (p. 3). None of these distinguishes motivation as a 
subcategory of behavior; none distinguishes motivational theory as 
distinct from general behavior theory. Most writers have not come to 
grips with the problem of differentiating motivation from everything 
else. 
Given this serious problem of definition, motivational theory 
rests on lists rather than principles. The traditional list includes three 
main motivational variables: drive, incentive, and reinforcement. 
There is no consensus as to whether these variables are to be invoked 
merely to explain the intensity of behavior, as argued by some au-
thors (e.g., Brown, 1953; Hebb, 1955; Hull, 1943; Woodworth, 1918), 
or to explain both the intensity and the direction of behavior as sug-
gested by others (e.g., Bindra, 1974; Teitelbaum, 1966; Toates, 1986; 
Young, 1949). 
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The Variables of Motivation 
DRIVE 
Early attempts to explain behavior involved inflexible reflexes and 
instincts as their basic elements. Reflexes and instincts were too rigid 
to accommodate instrumental behavior (e.g., Skinner, 1931, 1932), 
and instincts proved unpalatable because of the conceit that what 
applied to other animals did not apply to humans. While the in-
stincts that figure in the theories of James and McDougall were not 
carried forward into more modern theories of behavior, the con-
cept of drive, introduced by Woodworth in 1918, took their place. 
Woodworth posited multiple drives, the prototypes being hunger 
and thirst. Woodworth's notion was influenced by Sherrington's 
(1906) distinction between "preparatory" and "consummatory" (re-
ferring to consummation rather than consumption) behaviors. Pre-
paratory or "anticipatory" reactions were seen by Sherrington as 
responses to distant stimuli that constituted the" attempt either to ob-
tain actual contact or to avoid actual contact with the object" (p. 326). 
The basic tendencies to approach or withdraw from environmental 
stimuli were fundamental to Pavlov's early notions of orienting or 
investigatory reflexes on the one hand and defensive reflexes on the 
other (see, e.g., Sokolov, 1963). Craig's (1918) Sherrington-like dis-
tinction between" appetitive" and consummatory behaviors linked 
the root of the word "appetite" to the approach behaviors of inves-
tigation and manipulation. The tendency to approach or withdraw 
that was common to Pavlov's and Sherrington's basic reflexes would 
become the cornerstone of the important theory of motivation devel-
oped by Schneirla (1939, 1959) and extended by Glickman and Schiff 
(1967). 
Woodworth characterized the preparatory stage of a reaction as 
being marked by a state of tension, the strength of which was propor-
tional to the strength of the drive that would see the action through 
to its consummatory stage (completion). The drive theory first artic-
ulated by Woodworth was expanded on by later behaviorists, such 
as Hull (1943) and Hebb (1955). Inherent in Woodworth's view (as in 
Hull's and Hebb's) was the postulate that drive was directly respon-
sible for the intensity of behavior but not, directly, for the direction 
or selection of behavior. By intensifying the responsiveness to food 
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(by making food-related incentives more salient), however, hunger 
could indirectly increase the probability of feeding at the cost of play, 
sex, or some other alternative. The analogy of Hebb (1955) was to the 
automobile. In his model drive is like the gas pedal, determining how 
fast the car will go (or whether it will move at all), whereas environ-
mental cues govern the steering function, determining the direction 
the car will take (when and if it moves). While this distinction has 
generally not been made in social or personality theory, it has played 
a major role in behaviorist theories. 
Hull attempted to tie his drive concept closely to tissue needs. 
It was easy to accept that hunger was a response to caloric needs 
and thirst a response to hydrational needs. By tying drive states to 
physiological need, he offered a definition of drive that was not based 
on the behavior it was used to explain. By suggesting that the re-
duction of a need state was the necessary and sufficient condition 
for reinforcement of learning, he offered a plausible and noncircular 
theory of how adaptive behavior is learned. However, like many 
simple, elegant, and testable ideas, his was quickly shown to have 
major shortcomings. First, rats learn to lever press not only for glu-
cose, which replenishes the energy reserves of the body, but also for 
saccharin, which is useless as a bodily fuel (Sheffield & Roby, 1950). 
Second, most drinking in laboratory rats is ancillary to the eating of 
dry food rather than dictated by dehydration (Kissileff, 1969). Third, 
and perhaps more fatal than each of these flaws, eating and drinking 
anticipate (develop prior to) need; we usually eat and drink long 
before we develop states of tissue need (Fitzsimons, 1972; Le Mag-
nen, 1969). The growing problem of obesity in modern society should 
make it clear that the feeding behavior can be robust and compulsive 
in the absence of any serious threat of tissue need. Fourth, Hull's 
notion that drive is a general state, something akin to an arousal 
state, and that it energizes all motivated behaviors under a common 
guiding principle was unworkable. While it sidestepped the trivia Ii ty 
of Woodworth's multiple drives (each with its own rules and hence 
each with little generality), it offered an unsuitable model for sex, 
play, or even the avoidance of pain (see, e.g. Fiske & Maddi, 1961; 
Harlow, 1953). As pointed out by Beach (1956, p. 3) "Sexual activity 
is not, in the biological sense, essential to the well-being of the indi-
vidual. Despite the fact that arguments to the contrary often provide 
a convenient rationalization during certain stages of life, no one ever 
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died for the lack of sex." The argument that, just as hunger and thirst 
were essential to the survival of the individual, sex was essential to 
the survival of the species was specious; it is difficult to imagine that 
a copulating rat has the survival of its species on its mind. 
INCENTIVE MOTIVATION 
The attempt to define motivation in terms of needs and drives failed 
for a variety of additional reasons. While it is easy to imagine that 
hunger and thirst are controlled by internal factors reflecting need 
states, it is difficult to exclude a role for external factors in these-
and a dominating role for external factors in other-motivations. 
Male sexual arousal, for example, is often excited by purely visual or 
olfactory stimuli. The sight of an attractive female can quickly turn 
a male's thoughts away from other matters. The smell of a recep-
tive female can awaken a male rodent from sleep, elevate its brain 
temperature 1 ° or 1.5° C, and channel its behavior from other activ-
ities to the vigorous pursuit of social interaction (E. A. Kiyatkin & 
R. A. Wise, unpublished observations). While it might be suggested 
that sexual arousal is controlled by hormones-particularly in lower 
species-lehrman'S (1965) elegant studies of the reproductive cycles 
of ring doves illustrate how the hormonal levels that dominate the 
motivational states of the dove are themselves triggered by external 
stimulus displays. The feedback from one behavior triggers release of 
the hormones that induce sensitivity to the stimuli that, in turn, elicit 
the next behavior in the reproductive sequence. Indeed, even in the 
case of feeding it proved necessary to modify Hull's model to include 
what Spence (1956) labeled as "incentive motivation": the energizing 
of the animal by the food incentive and the otherwise neutral stimuli 
that become associated with food in the development of food-seeking 
habits. 
Incentive motivation, a drive like state-variable, was formulated 
as a contribution to the energizing of behavior rather than to the 
selection of behavior. A familiar example is the motivational state 
that results from the tasting of a salted peanut. A weak impulse-
arguably elicited by the sight of available nuts-to eat a peanut ac-
counts for the tasting of the first nut. The tasting of the first nut, 
however-the "sampling" of the incentive-arouses much stronger 
responsiveness to the remaining nuts. The person will now pursue 
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with more force the nuts that, at first, elicited a weak attraction. The 
difference in response strength between reaching for the first nut 
and reaching for the second is the portion of response strength at-
tributed to the initial contact with the incentive. The subject now 
has stronger arousal and stronger responsiveness to nuts than ex-
isted on the strength of either the physiological state or the stimulus 
situation that existed a moment earlier. The enhanced arousal and 
responsiveness is incentive motivation (meaning incentive-induced 
motivation or arousal rather than incentive-directed motivation or 
arousal). The increased responsiveness to the second nut suggests 
that the salience of the stimulus (Robinson & Berridge, 1993; Stewart, 
de Wit, & Eikelboom, 1984) has been increased by the tasting of the 
first nut. It is as if the second nut-as a result of increased appetite 
induced by the taste of the first nut-is brighter and more fragrant 
than the first nut. The construct of incentive motivation is normally 
invoked to explain the arousal associated with conditioned incentive 
stimuli rather than with the primary incentives themselves. 
Bolles (1975) explains how the motivational state-presumably 
contributing to the strength and not the selection of a response-has 
what appears to be a response-eliciting power in a food reinforce-
ment task: "when the hungry rat looks to the water side, nothing 
happens; but when it looks to the food side, it gets excited; thus it is 
more likely to go to the food side" (p. 294). Thus it is the sight, smell, 
taste, touch, or sound of the incentive that determines the direction 
of the behavior, and the combination of any internal drive state plus 
any incentive-motivational state that determines how strongly the 
subject is attracted in that direction. 
REINFORCEMENT 
Reinforcement, as a motivational topic, is in some ways an unlikely 
bedfellow for drive and incentive motivation. Reinforcement is more 
easily related to topics of learning and memory than to the topic of 
motivation. Reinforcement comes after motivated behavior whereas 
drive and incentive motivation precede the behavior and energize 
it. Reinforcement is defined as a mechanism for strengthening the 
relations between conditioned and unconditioned stimuli (Pavlov, 
1928) or for stamping in the associations between stimuli and re-
sponses (Thorndike, 1898), not as a mechanism for changing the mo-
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mentary state of mind of the animal. The fluctuations in response 
probability that accompany fluctuations in motivation are phasic, 
reversible changes like the waxing and waning of hunger and satiety 
or of sexual arousal and refractoriness. The effects of reinforcement, 
on the other hand, cause relatively permanent changes in response 
probability, acting to modify, it is thought, the long-term relations 
between synapses in the brain rather than the short-term levels of 
nutrients or hormones in the blood. Nonetheless, reinforcement is 
part and parcel of the topic of motivation. There are several reasons. 
First, the incentives that are primary to incentive motivation are, 
or lead to, reinforcers (Schnierla, 1939, 1959). The things approached 
are the things that reinforce exploratory approach patterns, convert-
ing them, gradually, into approach habits. The primary reinforcers 
are things that confer incentive value on the otherwise neutral stimuli 
that mark the path to food sources, fluid sources, and places of shelter 
from the elements. It is association with the primary reinforcer-the 
loved one-that makes special the "street where she lives." 
Second, the reinforcers that stamp in memory traces do so vari-
ably as a function of motivational states. Food is ineffective as a rein-
forcer when the animal is sated; indeed, lever pressing for food pro-
gressively extinguishes if the animal is tested when sated (Morgan, 
1974). Similarly, the tendency to lever press for intravenous drugs 
extinguishes under conditions of intoxication. Thus it is not just on-
going behavior that waxes and wanes with motivational state, so too 
does the reinforcing efficacy of various incentives. 
The Correlates of Motivation 
There is a strong movement to identify the subjective states of mo-
tivation, particularly within the field of addiction (see, e.g., Hether-
ington, 2001; Pickens & Johanson 1992; Tiffany, 1990). While many 
have argued that they are unknowable, speculations about the sub-
jective states of even the laboratory rat generate considerable interest 
(Acquas, Carboni, Leone, & Oi Chiara, 1989; Koob 1996; Robinson & 
Berridge, 1993, 2001; Rossetti, Lai, Hmaidan, & Gessa, 1993; Wise, 
1982,2001). 
The subjective correlates of drive are craving, hunger, and desire. 
To illustrate a point about what comes first and what follows, Robin-
son and Berridge (1993) have introduced "wanting" as a synonym 
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for craving. Unlike terms like hunger, thirst, and withdrawal distress, 
which tend to focus on antecedent conditions, such terms focus atten-
tion on the subject's state of mind prior to the behavior of interest. For 
those who posit that we work to reduce drive states (e.g., Dackis & 
Gold, 1985; Hull 1943; Koob, Stinus, Le MoaI, & Bloom, 1989), it is 
generally assumed that these are, to one degree or another, unpleas-
ant states. Indeed, it is clear that, if they have the choice, animals 
will avoid the places where they have experienced the conditions 
associated with such states (Bechara, Nader, & van der Kooy, 1995). 
The subjective correlates of incentive motivation-wanting, crav-
ing, desire, and the like-are common to the subjective correlates of 
drive. Lust is perhaps the most obvious model here; for the males of 
most species lust (inferred craving or desire for sexual interaction) 
is associated more clearly with external arousing stimuli than with 
internal hormonal levels or conditions of privation. 
The subjective correlates of reinforcement can be identified with 
much less confidence than the subjective correlates of drive or in-
centive motivation. The widespread assumption is that reinforce-
ment has positive affective correlates. Pleasure and euphoria are the 
most frequently suggested correlates of reward (McAuliffe & Gor-
don, 1974, 1980; Olds, 1956); "liking" has been more recently sug-
gested (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). However, it is not at all clear 
that pleasure is associated with all rewards; monkeys can be trained 
to work for aversive shock (Kelleher & Morse, 1968) and various 
compulsive human activities-such as competitive sports and var-
ious forms of thrill seeking-are stressful if not painful. Anecdotal 
evidence would suggest that even addictive drugs can serve as effec-
tive reinforcers in the absence of any associated pleasure or eupho-
ria. First-time heroin users, for example, often report that the drug 
produces nausea and discomfort (Haertzen, 1966); it is, nonetheless, 
strongly habit forming. After long exposure to heroin, addicts fre-
quently report that the drug continues to control them despite having 
lost any ability to cause pleasure or euphoria (Chein, Gerard, Lee, & 
Rosenfeld, 1964). Thus pleasure is clearly not a necessary correlate 
of reinforcement. Moreover, animals consistently avoid flavors that 
have been associated with addictive drugs (Cappell & LeBlanc, 1971; 
Cappell, LeBlanc, & Endrenyi, 1973) despite the fact that they self-
administered those drugs (Wise, Yokel, & de Wit, 1976). 
The subjective correlates of the absence of pleasure are dyspho-
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ria and anhedonia. While it has been suggested that blocking the 
synaptic action of brain dopamine causes a state of anhedonia or 
dysphoria-blunting the hedonic impact of food, water, rewarding 
brain stimulation, and several drugs of abuse (Wise, 1982)-this sug-
gestion was based on evidence that reinforcement function, not he-
donic function per se, was attenuated by dopamine blockers (Wise, 
1985). While it is clear that dopaminergic blockade attenuates the 
rewarding effects of amphetamine (Risner & Jones, 1976; Yokel & 
Wise, 1975, 1976), it has been reported not to block amphetamine-
induced euphoria in humans (Brauer & de Wit, 1997, but see Gunne, 
Anggard, & Jonsson, 1972; Jonsson, Anggard, & Gunne, 1971). Thus, 
again, pleasure does not appear to be a necessary correlate of the 
behavioral control exerted by reinforcers. 
The Etiology of Addiction 
The phenomenon of addiction and the animal models used to study 
it offer heuristic insights into more conventional motivational states. 
There are two important features of addiction that differentiate it 
from more traditional motivations. First, to the degree that drugs 
come to satisfy bodily needs, it is largely acquired bodily needs that 
they satisfy (Hebb, 1949; Malmo, 1975); thus in addiction we can 
study the acquisition of need states that parallel the innate need states 
associated with hunger and thirst. Second, whereas the incentives of 
food and water are sensed (we can see, hear, taste, touch, or smell 
them), the incentives of drugs of abuse are unsensed, at least by 
laboratory animals that are unable to examine the contents of their 
remote syringes and protected infusion lines. The animal working 
for intravenous cocaine or heroin detects the drug by only one of 
its five peripheral senses (taste), and then only after the drug has 
been consumed and has diffused into the saliva. The traditional def-
inition of an incentive is that of a thing approached; the animal can 
never approach an intravenous drug injection or a rewarding brain 
stimulation event in the way that it can approach a food pellet or a 
sexual partner. Thus animal models of addiction can reveal aspects of 
drive and incentive motivation that are not evident with more natural 
rewards like food, water, or potential mates. 
Unlike the cases of hunger and thirst, the case of addiction of-
fers no deficit-driven need for drug at the time of the initial drug 
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reinforcement. What comes first is the first drink, the first puff, the 
first snort, the first injection. If what is known about reinforcement 
is valid, the motivation for the second ingestion of a reinforcing dose 
will be stronger than the motivation for the first. Whatever it is that is 
stamped in by reinforcers will presumably start strengthening from 
the very first ingestion. This will include the stamping in of the mem-
ory traces of the proprioceptive feedback from the specific responses 
that led up to the injection, and it will include the stamping in of 
memory traces associating the drug experience with the various stim-
uli in the surrounding environment. In some way the reinforcing ex-
perience will also decrease the fear of repeating the act. The concerns 
that accompanied the first ingestion will be weaker with successive 
ingestions. 
What is the motivation for the first self-administration of a drug 
of abuse? This is not easily answered. There are many different mo-
tivations-social conformation, peer pressure, status seeking, thrill 
seeking, relief of boredom, curiosity-so many that we might almost 
consider the first use of a given drug something akin to the first lever 
press in an operant chamber: if not an accident, at least not a response 
that is dependent on any identifiable reinforcement history. How-
ever, the motivation for subsequent self-administrations gradually 
comes under the control of the reinforcement history. Just as natural 
selection narrows the possibilities for evolution, so does reinforce-
ment narrow the possibilities for future behavior. With each subse-
quent administration of a reinforcing drug, the freedom of choice-
the freedom to accept or decline another administration-is, at least 
according to reinforcement theory, reduced. In the end, there will be 
very little freedom of choice for an addict who may have assumed 
complete freedom during the early stages of drug use; reinforcement 
is one of the powerful factors that eventually restricts freedom of 
choice. 
Two things change as a subject continues to self-administer a 
drug. First, there are adaptations of the brain and the gut that occur 
in the same way and to the same degree whether the subject takes 
the drug actively or receives it passively. These include adaptations 
in the autonomic nervous system and changes in the brain circuitry 
through which the drugs have their rewarding effects. While many of 
the neuroadaptations-particularly the adaptations of the autonomic 
nervous system-are unique to the drug or drug class (Kalant, 1977), 
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some of the neuroadaptations of reward circuitry resulting from re-
peated treatment are common to such different drug classes as the 
stimulants and the opiates (Beitner-Johnson & Nestler, 1991; Beitner-
Johnson, Guitart, & Nestler, 1992; Berhow et al., 1995). It is widely 
held that some subset of these neuroadaptations must contribute to 
the fact that drug taking becomes progressively more compulsive 
with repeated drug self-administration. 
Neuroadaptations that are simple and direct consequences of 
the pharmacological action of the drug cannot, however, explain the 
rituals of drug procurement, drug preparation, and drug taking that 
form the habit structure of addiction. Nor can the fact that such drug-
induced neuroadaptations involve the brain mechanisms responsi-
ble for learning and memory (Berke & Hyman, 2000; Nestler, 2001) 
explain the critical memory traces that distinguish the brains of self-
inflicted addicts from the brains of drug-experienced individuals that 
do not self-administer the drug. The memory traces that are formed 
uniquely by the specific acts of drug self-administration thus form 
a second class of neuroadaptation that clearly plays a central role 
in the increasingly compulsive nature of drug taking. Indeed, the 
fact that passive receipt of drug injections can result in neuroadapta-
tions within the brain mechanisms of learning and memory creates a 
special problem for the addiction theorist: How do we differentiate 
the neuroadaptations that are associated with a drug-taking habit 
from the neuroadaptations that are associated with a passive drug-
receiving history? Woods (1990) has estimated that fewer than 0.01 % 
of those receiving opiates passively go on to become opiate addicts. 
Another problem for the theorist is how to distinguish neuroadap-
tations associated with drug-seeking habits from neuroadaptations 
associated with food-seeking, sex-seeking, thrill-seeking, or other 
compulsive habits that depend on shared or parallel motivational 
circuitry (see Bardo & Dwoskin, this volume). 
It is the neuroadaptations associated with the drug-seeking habit 
and drug-associated memories that are most central to the under-
standing of the compulsive nature of addiction. This is perhaps most 
clearly evident from animal models of intracranial self-stimulation 
and intravenous drug self-administration, where the animals never 
have direct sensory contact with the stimulation or the drug. Whereas 
the human addict eventually sees, fondles, smells, and perhaps tastes 
the drug that is ingested, the animal with a brain stimulation reward 
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habit or an intravenous drug habit has never seen, never touched, 
never smelled, never tasted its reinforcer. The reinforcer is deliv-
ered directly to the brain or to the heart, through wires or infusion 
catheters that are opaque and ever present. Thus in these cases the 
reinforcer itself is not the incentive that is approached; only learned 
incentives-conditioned incentive stimuli-are approached. The 
things approached are the walls, lights, levers, or nose-poke holes 
where the animal is able to trigger the hidden mechanisms that de-
liver the stimulation or the drug. The levers, lights, and holes become 
learned incentives and secondary reinforcers, as their manipulation 
or their display becomes associated with time-locked drug delivery. 
The street corner where drug is purchased (Simon & Burns, 1997), 
the seller, the pipe or syringe-these are things that become objects 
of compulsive search and approach. Along with the laying down of 
learned associations and memories of how to remove the hubcap 
quietly, how to approach the seller surreptitiously, how to keep the 
cash safe until the transaction is made, how to slip into the safe house 
without being noticed by the police or by local freeloaders-along 
with all these memory traces there accrue, with drug experience, the 
neuroadaptations associated with the unlearning of various fears. In 
the case of the laboratory animal, these involve fear of the strange 
testing situation: the apparatus itself, the handling, the drag of con-
nected stimulating cables or drug lines, the sudden clicks and intra-
venous pressure or neuronal activation associated with responding. 
None of these specific memories can be stamped in by the doctor-
or experimenter-administered drug injections that produce the neu-
roadaptations that have been identified to date. 
A strong case has been argued for consideration of addiction as a 
"brain disease" (Leshner, 1997; McLellan, Lewis, O'Brien, & Kleber, 
2000). Inasmuch as some drugs of abuse are neurotoxic (Carlson 1977; 
Schmidt, 1987; Wagner, Ricaurte, Seiden, Schuster, Miller, & Westley, 
1980), it is clear that addiction can cause brain disease. What is not yet 
equally clear, however, is the degree to which brain disease causes ad-
diction. Here we come up against the thorny question of which comes 
first and which follows. It is often suggested in recent years that mere 
self-administration of drugs-the self-administration, for example, 
demonstrated over the last several decades in limited-access animal 
models-is not tantamount to addiction (e.g., Ahmed & Koob, 1998; 
Robinson & Berridge, 2000; Tornatzky & Miczek, 2000). With increas-
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ing attempts and increasing failure to find an objective, noncircular 
definition for addiction (Wise, 1987), it has become fashionable to 
characterize addiction as compulsive drug self-administration, and 
to look for the event or events that explain the transition from casual 
to compulsive drug self-administration. The operant psychologist 
can only wonder how reinforcement itself has come to be seen as 
insufficient to explain addiction without further postulates. Positive 
reinforcement is the only explanation sought or offered for the com-
pulsive self-administration of direct electrical stimulation to the lat-
eral hypothalamus, and this is a behavior sufficiently compulsive to 
lead, like self-administration of cocaine, to self-starvation and death. 
It has never been suggested that some form of brain disease is re-
quired to explain the happy, healthy, long-living (if allowed access 
to stimulation for only a limited portion of each day), compulsively 
self-stimulating rat. 
The possibility that has status of place in the history of addiction 
theory is that adaptations to the repeated pharmacological actions of 
the drug bias the brain and body to such a degree that self-medication 
becomes necessary for normal mood, function, and homeostasis. Of-
ten referred to as dependence theory, this "medical model," or "self-
medication hypothesis," is best characterized as an opponent-pro-
cess view of motivation (Solomon & Corbit, 1974) and addiction 
(Solomon & Corbit, 1973). In early incarnations, dependence mod-
els focused on compensatory responses identified largely with the 
autonomic nervous system (Wei, Tseng, Loh, & Way, 1974) and the 
withdrawal distress-sweating, cramps, diarrhea, thermoregulatory 
disturbance-that is experienced when opiate or alcohol use is dis-
continued. As evidence accumulated against the view that withdraw-
al distress was a necessary condition for addiction (Deneau, Yanagita, 
& Seevers, 1969; Jaffe, 1985; McAuliffe & Gordon, 1980; Wise, 1987; 
Woods & Schuster, 1971), attention shifted from the adaptations of 
the autonomic nervous system to adaptations within the brain mech-
anisms of reward themselves, which might desensitize the subjects to 
various forms of pleasure and reinforcement (Dackis & Gold, 1985; 
Frank, Martz, & Pommering, 1988; Kokkinidis, Zacharko, & Predy, 
1980; Leith & Barrett, 1976; Markou & Koob, 1991; Nestler, 1992). 
It is clear that there are many neuroadaptations that result from re-
peated drug use (Nestler,2001; White &Kalivas,1998),and that in the 
neuroadapted state the drug itself can oppose the effects of at least 
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some of those neuroadaptations: the drug effect, for the moment, 
shifts the animal back in the direction of normalcy. That is, the drug 
does "medicate," by opposing them, some of the neuroadaptations 
induced by past use of the drug. To what degree such neuroadapta-
tions are causes rather than consequences of addiction, however, is 
only beginning to be examined in depth (Carlezon et al., 1998; Kelz 
et al., 1999). The answer depends fundamentally on a very simple 
issue: which comes first and which after? In addition, it is not clear to 
what effect the known neuroadaptations are drug-opposite in nature; 
indeed, most of the known neuroadaptations have been found to 
result from drug treatments that cause sensitization, not tolerance, 
to the drug in question. 
Our own studies of drug self-administration in rodents have 
led me to suspect that drug self-administration becomes compulsive 
long before the significant development of most of the recently char-
acterized neuroadaptations. We have no scientific standards for the 
word "compulsive," but dictionary definitions involve such terms as 
being compelled, forced, coerced, or constrained: "in psychopathol-
ogy, an irresistible impulse to perform some irrational act." One mea-
sure of compulsion is the domination of the compelling behavior 
over less compelling alternatives. Rats or monkeys allowed to lever 
press for unlimited intravenous amphetamine or cocaine injections 
will do so to the point of death (Bozarth & Wise, 1985; Johanson, 
Balster, & Bonese, 1976). Thus we normally do not allow our animals 
unlimited drug access, but restrict them to sessions of 4 hours or less 
per day. 
A second criterion for compulsion is invariance and predictabil-
ity. Once a habit is established to the point of no return, the most 
critical transition toward addiction has already occurred. So long as 
reinforcement continues, the habit will only become more strongly 
stamped in. Our experienced animals respond for intravenous co-
caine at very constant rates, suggesting strongly established habits; 
the standard deviation of their inter-response times is close to 20% 
of their mean inter-response time. When their inter-response inter-
vals reach this level of regularity we can predict with great certainty 
that they would continue to self-administer the drug compulsively 
to the point of death if given the opportunity. This level of control 
is evident in some animals within a single day of training; in 90% of 
our animals it is reached within five days of training in 4-hour daily 
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sessions. In the absence of catheter or vein failures, such a habit will 
always become progressively more compulsive-that is, the stan-
dard deviation of the inter-response times will invariably continue 
to decrease-over the next few weeks. Thus, after as little as one 
or two days of training it is often clear that a given animal has al-
ready reached the stage of compulsive responding. While drug self-
administration during 4-hour periods of drug access per day may 
not establish the escalated (Ahmed & Koob, 1998) or dysregulated 
(Tornatzky & Miczek, 2000) intake patterns that become typical of 
animals tested for longer periods with higher doses or unlimited 
access, testing animals under conditions of limited access is sufficient 
to establish self-administration habits that are compulsive enough to 
irrevocably lead, under unrestricted access, to such escalation and 
dysregulation. Studies of the neuroadaptations to addictive drugs 
have, for the most part, been based on much longer and stronger drug 
exposure than is required to establish the point of no return. 
I would not argue this for all drugs, nor would I argue it for 
all doses or routes of administration of even the psychomotor stim-
ulants. However, in the case of intravenous cocaine, amphetamine, 
and heroin, I think compulsive habits-irrevocably compulsive hab-
its when drug is freely available-are established very early in the 
animal's exposure, long before we see signs of escalated or dysregu-
lated intake. Most of the neuroadaptations we are currently studying 
are established after much more severe regimens of repeated drug 
administration than are necessary to establish sensitized behavioral 
responses to the drug. 
Whatever the strength of the treatments required to produce 
them, most of the neuroadaptations we are currently studying are 
not the neuroadaptations associated with the memory traces of the 
response habit itself. Continued opportunity for drug self-adminis-
tration extends the stamping in of the response habit and the stimulus 
associations that sustain the behavior. Inasmuch as the peripheral 
senses of the animal are exposed to the manipulandum and sur-
rounding stimuli but not the drug itself, the things the animal learns 
to approach are the features of the test box that, until associated with 
reinforcement, have only the appeal of novelty. In our paradigm, the 
most obvious learned incentives are the lever and the light above the 
lever. We see a form of autoshaping as the habit becomes established. 
Our light is illuminated whenever the pump is delivering drug; it 
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gives the signal that the animal has made the required response and 
that the drug effect will soon be felt. At first the rat just appears to 
notice the light, glancing at it briefly after each response. In time the 
animal begins to approach the light, sniff it, lick it, and eventually bite 
it after each lever press. The approach to the light, like the approach 
to the lever, becomes highly driven, and the drive is clearly due to 
the conditioned association between the reinforcing injection and the 
manipulandum and cue light. As the regularity of approach to the 
lever increases with each reinforced trial, the incentive value and 
salience of other environmental stimuli-for example, an identical 
but ineffective ("inactive") manipulandum-presumably decrease. 
As the animal is repeatedly reinforced for the investigatory re-
flexes that result in the initial lever presses, the behavior comes un-
der increasing stimulus control. The strong stimulus control that can 
be established within the first hour of testing results in invigorated 
approach, sniffing, and facial poking at the lever. In the early stages 
of this learning, the animal may make several responses during the 
time-out period when the pump is already delivering an injection. It 
may also earn two or more injections in rapid succession. This is a 
learned response pattern, clearly resulting from prior reinforcement. 
The excitement at the lever is a manifestation of incentive motivation: 
activation due to the experience of the incentives in the situation. 
Prior to the first response of the day, the incentives are the learned 
incentives, the environmental stimuli that, through learning, have be-
come associated with the primary reinforcer. After the first response, 
the decaying signal from the last reinforcement is a second source of 
incentive motivation. 
The incentive motivation caused by the unconditioned reinforcer 
itself is often termed a "priming effect." It is an unlearned response 
that decays rapidly as soon as the reinforcer is no longer felt. The 
rapid decay of the priming effect is most obvious with the reward of 
direct electrical stimulation of the brain, where the reinforcer usually 
lasts a half-second or less and decays as rapidly as it appears. The 
running speed of a brain-stimulation-rewarded animal, reinforced at 
the end of a runway, varies with both the strength of reinforcement 
in the goal box and also the strength of any "priming" stimulation 
that is given in the start box. However, it is only the memory of the 
last reinforcement, not the memory of the last priming stimulation, 
that is effective after a minute or two delay (Gallistel, Stellar, & Bubis, 
176 
MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS IN THE ETIOLOGY OF DRUG ABUSE 
1974). Thus the priming that energizes responding leaves no lasting 
memory trace, whereas the memory of the most recent reinforced 
trials lasts and can influence subsequent running speed despite the 
passage of a week or more. Priming stimuli are the effective termina-
tors of periods of abstinence; they are among the most potent stimuli 
for reinstating temporarily disrupted self-administration habits (de 
Wit & Stewart, 1981, 1983; Gerber & Stretch, 1975; Stretch & Gerber, 
1973). 
Priming stimulation is used a good deal by workers in the field of 
brain stimulation reward and intravenous stimulant self-administra-
tion. In an untrained animal, priming stimulation or priming stimu-
lant injections cause the heightened state of arousal that is the hall-
mark of incentive motivation and psychomotor activation. Even in 
the untrained animal, priming stimulation is an energizer of behav-
ior. The forward locomotion it induces is initially aimless, increas-
ing the probability of movement but not of any particular move-
ment. Priming stimulation is used in its simplest form to wake or 
activate the animal. In the trained animal, however, priming stim-
ulation and priming injections selectively energize approach to the 
reinforcement-associated stimuli in the environment: the side of the 
cage containing the manipulandum and the manipulandum itself. In 
experienced animals, priming appears to be a very effective stimulus 
for craving. Indeed, I believe this is why 12-point rehabilitation pro-
grams set total abstinence as their goal; in the wake of the priming 
effect of a first cigarette, a first drink, or a first snort it becomes much 
more difficult to resist a second. 
Priming injections are often given to animals at the beginning 
of cocaine self-administration sessions where drug-free animals are 
more reluctant to initiate cocaine self-administration than might be 
expected by nonspecialists. The memory of yesterday's cocaine re-
inforcement apparently carries an ambivalent memory, one tinged, 
it would seem, with some form of anxiety; when treated with anx-
iolytic drugs trained rats are much quicker to initiate cocaine self-
administration (Ettenberg & Geist, 1991). Priming overcomes this 
anxiety and shifts the animal's responsiveness to the incentive (ap-
proach-inducing) properties of the drug-associated cues. 
Priming is confounded with reinforcement in lever-pressing 
tasks where no time-out is imposed. When time-outs or low-density 
reinforcement schedules are used, the inter-response time can exceed 
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the period of effective priming that is established by the previous 
reinforcement. When animals are allowed to earn reinforcement at 
their own preferred frequency, the varying strength of the priming 
effect largely determines when craving will again arise and when the 
next response will be made. I will return to this topic in the section 
on regulation of drug intake. 
With sufficient drug experience, animals undergo a number of 
the neuroadaptive changes mentioned earlier (Nestler & Aghajanian, 
1997; White & Kalivas, 1998). Many of these known adaptations are 
within the circuitry of the brain that is essential for the reinforcing 
actions of drugs of abuse. While most of the known neuroadapta-
tions last less than a week or two, they may prove important in the 
development of more long-lasting changes. The craving-associated 
memory traces of the addict are themselves long-lasting; thus it is the 
long-lasting neuroadaptations-probably most importantly those as-
sociated with learning and memory for past drug experience-that 
offer the possibility of an explanation for the problems of relapse 
and compulsion that plague the addict. The most interesting long-
lasting changes are perhaps the dendritic branching of neurons in 
the reward pathway (Robinson & Kolb, 1997, 1999). Such changes can 
be produced by self-administered cocaine experience of as little as 1 
hour per day (although such exposure has been maintained for many 
days in the work thus far: Robinson, Gorny, Mitton, & Kolb, 2001). 
It is clear that some changes in the brain must distinguish the 
addicted brain from the nonaddicted brain. One thing that remains 
to be determined is whether any of the known changes-changes in-
duced, for the most part, by high doses of experimenter-administered 
drugs-is a significant contributing cause of addiction and not just a 
consequence of addiction. That is, must any of these known neuroad-
aptations occur prior to the transition from voluntary to compulsive 
drug self-administration? Or must there already be compulsive drug 
self-administration before there is sufficient drug exposure to pro-
duce the known neuroadaptations and make them stand out from 
the everyday neuroadaptations that result from the various stresses 
and pleasures of normal life? A second thing to be determined is the 
relative importance of differences between the drug-naive and the 
drug-addicted brain and differences between the brains of experi-
enced subjects that have self-administered the drug and experienced 
subjects that have received the drug passively. 
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The Regulation of Drug Intake 
Hunger and thirst are the prototypical drive states of motivational 
theory. Motivation for food and water wax and wane, and behavior 
makes a major contribution to the maintenance of homeostatic bal-
ance. Fluctuations in water seeking and food seeking are periodic and 
periods of satiety determine when water and food will be ineffective 
as reinforcers (Smith, 1982). The behavioral contribution to fluid and 
energy balance has been termed "behavioral homeostasis." 
Thirst is the simplest model because the category of water is well 
defined while the category of food includes a wide variety of sub-
stances and varies between cultures and environments. Fluid balance 
is controlled in part by the function of the kidney, which extracts 
water from the blood when blood pressure is high and ceases to do so 
when pressure (and its usual correlate, extracellular fluid volume) is 
low. Fluid balance is also influenced by bod y temperature; the evapo-
ration of perspiration and saliva are major sources of cooling in a hot 
environment and after exertion. Finally, fluid balance is controlled 
by behavior; when blood pressure is low or when salt concentration 
in cells of the hypothalamus is high thirst is experienced and the 
probability of water seeking and drinking is increased. 
It is of interest to inquire just how water seeking and drinking are 
triggered. The traditional view is the drive hypothesis. Epstein (1973) 
summarized the thirst literature of the time with the suggestion that 
"(a) thirst goes on in the brain, (b) the neurological machine for thirst 
integrates multiple inputs, and (c) from these inputs a specific moti-
vational state arises and drives the animal to seek water and ingest 
it" (p. 316). This summary is useful for those who are interested in the 
sensation and perception of thirst, but it offers no explanation of the 
motivational consequences of thirst. Rather, the research has focused 
on the sensing of deficit, not the control of behavior by deficit. The 
research, valuable as it has been in identifying the sources of thirst, 
deals with the sensory physiology, not the motivation, of drinking 
behavior. The drive hypothesis always fails to suggest a mechanism 
for the initiation and energizing of the seeking and ingesting acts. 
An incentive-motivational hypothesis, in contrast, offers at least the 
outline of a mechanism. It suggests that the state of dehydration 
increases probability of water seeking and drinking by increasing 
the salience-the Siren Cryl-of water-associated incentives in the 
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environment, and that these learned incentives-with their stronger 
valences the closer they are to the goal-lead the animal from point to 
point along the learned path to water. The drive hypothesis suggests 
that it is the reduction of the need state or reduction of the associated 
drive that accounts for the reinforcing effects of water for a thirsty 
animal, whereas incentive-oriented studies suggest it is enhanced 
responsiveness to the lure of the incentive that is critical. The issue 
is whether the drive causes a push stimulus to action or rather the 
environmental cue causes a pull to action. The latter hypothesis is 
the stronger one, because it can account for the direction the animal 
takes; the animal that is responsive to drive and ignores the envi-
ronment has little chance of getting on the right path, whereas the 
animal that is more and more strongly attracted to water-associated 
environmental stimuli is very likely to be drawn to water once thirst 
makes the animal sufficiently sensitive to such cues. 
Drive states clearly modulate the motivational effectiveness of 
environmental stimuli. Studies of air licking in thirsty rats suggest 
that it is the cooling sensation in the oral cavity that accounts for the 
reinforcing effects of ingested fluids, and that such cooling sensations 
are reinforcing only if the animal is dehydrated (Freed & Mendelson, 
1974; Mendelson & Chillag, 1970; Ramsauer, Mendelson, & Freed, 
1974). Thirsty animals will not only drink water; they will lick at air 
streams that cool the oral cavity. They will lick at cool airstreams and 
they will lick at warm airstreams if the warm air is dry enough to 
evaporate saliva from the oral cavity (Freed & Mendelson, 1974). Air 
licking is an act that becomes compulsive in fluid-deprived rodents 
despite the fact that this behavior increases, through evaporation, 
the bodily need for water. The incentive motivational hypothesis is 
that behavior of the thirsty animal becomes controlled by the thirst-
enhanced salience of stimuli that have, in the animal's reinforcement 
history, been associated with oral cooling. The reinforcing action of 
oral cooling in thirsty rodents is a sufficient mechanism to guarantee 
that few individuals fail to meet their hydrational needs except under 
conditions of extreme drought, since few rodents outside the labora-
tory ever find means of oral cooling that fail to involve the ingestion 
of fluids. 
In a similar way, the reinforcing property of sweet taste is a suffi-
ciently powerful stimulus to guarantee that animals do not starve 
to death in the presence of fruit. That sweet things become more 
180 
MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS IN THE ETIOLOGY OF DRUG ABUSE 
attractive during states of privation (Cabanac, 1971) guarantees con-
sumption of sweet things, which, except in laboratory conditions 
(Sheffield & Roby, 1950), tend to provide for much of an animal's 
nutrient need. Reinforcement by sweet taste provides a mechanism 
that makes intake of caloric foods highly probable in the wild. Drive-
induced modulation of the salience of sweetness makes such intake 
more probable during states of privation. Control by sweetness usu-
ally accomplishes these things without the direct intervention of ac-
tual need reduction. However, the more an animal needs glucose, the 
more it can be seduced by the sweet taste of a non-nutritive substance 
(Jacobs & Sharma, 1969). Thus drive reduction is a seemingly inade-
quate and, indeed, seemingly incorrect explanation of why food and 
water are reinforcing. 
It remains possible, however, that sweet taste becomes reinforc-
ing through experience with need reduction. Le Magnen (1959) has 
shown that rats adjust their intake of a given food, after four or five 
days, on the basis of the caloric value of the food but also the caloric 
value of intra gastric glucose that is given as a supplement. The ani-
mal's approach to the food is adjusted to compensate for the amount 
of glucose in the associated stomach load. Thus it is possible that even 
sweet taste is an acquired incentive, one that is reinforcing because of 
prior conditioning, prior need reduction, associated with sweet tastes 
in the past (Le Magnen, 1959; Myers and Sclafani, 2001a, 200lb). 
Mammals gain experience with sweet taste-and, indeed, have their 
needs met in association with the sweet taste of mothers' milk-from 
the time of birth; such experience results from the consequences of 
the expression of the neonatal suckling reflex. Sweet taste is an in-
strumental reinforcer very early in life; rats can learn on the first day 
of life to lever press for intra-oral milk infusions (Johanson & Hall, 
1979). However, rats do not show deprivation-enhanced approach 
to either food or water stimuli until much later in life (Changizi, 
McGehee, & Hall, 2002). Thus the modulation of ingestive reflexes 
may itself be learned. In any case, whether or not need reduction 
contributes to the reinforcing effects of such things as oral cooling or 
sweet taste, it is the sensory events of oral cooling and sweet taste that 
come to control motivated behavior. They do so to the point that oral 
cooling or sweet taste in the absence of need reduction can become 
compulsive and dominate other behaviors (Jacobs & Sharma, 1967). 
Just as drinking and eating are cyclic behaviors, characterized 
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by periods of drive and satiety, so is drug seeking a cyclic behav-
ior in animal models of intravenous drug self-administration. Well-
trained animals respond about once every five minutes for 1 mg/kg 
injections of cocaine (Wise, Newton, Leeb, Burnette, Pocock, & Jus-
tice, 1995), about once every 20 minutes for 0.1 mg/kg injections 
of heroin (Gerber & Wise, 1989), and about once every 30 minutes 
for 0.25 mg/kg injections of amphetamine (Yokel & Pickens, 1973, 
1974). Such injections cause, each by its own pharmacological mech-
anism, elevations of brain dopamine in nucleus accumbens. This ele-
vation is essential to the reinforcing effects of amphetamine (Lyness, 
Friedle, & Moore, 1979; Yokel & Wise, 1975) and cocaine (de Wit & 
Wise, 1977; Roberts, Corcoran, & Fibiger, 1977) and, arguably, heroin 
(Bozarth & Wise, 1986; Wise, 1989). At the beginning of each test 
session, the trained animal responds frequently; this phase of the 
session is termed the "loading phase" and is seen as a period when 
the behavior of the animal is establishing some level of drug satiety. 
After a pause in which much of the previous injection is metabolized, 
the animal then settles down to slower and more regular responding 
termed the "maintenance phase" of the session. It is in the mainte-
nance phase that the animal appears to regulate its drug intake with 
some kind of homeostatic precision. 
In the maintenance phase of responding, the animal makes each 
response for additional cocaine (Wise, Newton, Leeb, Burnette, Po-
cock, & Justice, 1995), amphetamine (Ranaldi, Pocock, Zereik, & Wise, 
1999), or heroin (Wise, Leone, Rivest, & Leeb, 1995) long before dopa-
mine levels return to normal baseline. The dopamine level at the time 
of response may differ somewhat between animals, ranging between 
two and three times the normal basal level of nucleus accumbens 
dopamine. While there is variability of trigger level between animals, 
the level within a given animal is quite consistent. It is as if the 
animal is "hungry" for drug whenever dopamine levels fall below 
about 200% of normal and as if they are sated whenever dopamine 
levels surge above about 300% of normal. One may question whether 
this is a true case of homeostatic regulation, but it is not really clear 
what constitutes "true" regulation even in the case of food or fluid 
intake. We know that many humans take in more food than they 
need to maintain body weight, and they do so despite significant 
penalties, gradually increasing their weight and their health risks 
over the course of their lifetime. Similarly, we know that there is 
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little penalty for taking in more fluid than we need, as, for example, 
when drinking beer on a hot day; excess is simply excreted. Thus 
the term "regulation" has wide application and is descriptive rather 
than explanatory; the appearance of regulation is evident in many 
things and is always a phenomenon to be understood rather than to 
be used as an explanation. Whether apparent regulation depends on 
reward in states of depletion or penalties or nonreward during states 
of satiety must be determined individually for each incentive that is 
capable of establishing compulsive behavior. 
The apparent regulation of drug intake involves a rate of intake 
that matches, reasonably well, the rate of metabolism. Once the an-
imals have loaded their system with drug, each subsequent injec-
tion is taken when the drug level in blood (Yokel & Pickens, 1973, 
1974) and the dopamine level in nucleus accumbens (Ranaldi et al., 
1999; Wise, Newton, Leeb, Burnette, Pocock, & Justice, 1995; Wise, 
Leone, Rivest, & Leeb, 1995) have been metabolized to within 10% 
or so of the levels at which the last injection was taken. The hy-
pothesis that the drug intake is somehow regulated by drug level 
in the blood, dopamine level in the brain, or some correlate of the 
two is self-evident and confirmed by the finding that supplemental 
experimenter-administered infusions of the drug postpone the ani-
mal's next response by just enough to compensate for the supplement 
(Gerber & Wise, 1989; Tsibulsky & Norman, 1999). The mechanics of 
how this level of regulation is achieved remain to be determined. 
The issue of regulation revolves around the question of why, 
if the drug is powerfully reinforcing, the animals do not take drug 
more frequently than they do. Why, if food is powerfully reinforcing, 
do we not overeat? Of course we often do, but food loses at least 
some of its reinforcing efficacy-its incentive salience-in periods of 
satiety (Cabanac, 1971). Is the same true for cocaine? The control of 
subsequent drug intake by drug in the blood, dopamine in the brain, 
or some correlate of the two could reflect either active or passive 
regulation. That is, the animals might be conjoined against taking 
more drug, just as a full stomach and its hormonal consequences is 
one of the factors that actively inhibits food intake (Smith & Gibbs, 
1994), by some performance impairing or aversive effects of high 
drug or transmitter levels. Neither of these possibilities would seem 
to be the case. First, we know from two-lever tests offering the choice 
between drug and brain stimulation reinforcement that rats remain 
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capable of lever pressing at high rates between normal responses 
for amphetamine (Wise, Yokel, Hansson, & Gerber, 1977) or heroin 
(Gerber, Bozarth, Spindler, & Wise, 1985). Second, we know that the 
animals do not find higher levels of drug or dopamine to become, on 
balance, aversive. If they did, they would choose between two levers 
the one associated with smaller doses, keeping low the peak drug 
and dopamine levels resulting from each injection (but compensating 
by taking the low dose more frequently). Instead, if anything, rats 
and monkeys, while taking them less frequently, prefer the higher of 
two doses offered concurrently (Iglauer, Llewellyn, & Woods, 1976; 
Manzardo, Del Rio, Stein, & Belluzzi, 2001; Yokel, 1987). 
It appears most likely that the intake of stimulants, at least, is 
passively regulated; as in the case of water intake, there is apparently 
no significant penalty for taking more than satiating levels of drug, 
but neither, it appears, is there any significant benefit. Thus, the ten-
dency of animals to respond soon after the previous injection, which 
is seen in the first few days of training, appears to gradually disap-
pear because there is no added reward value of drug once dopamine 
levels are elevated. As the animal learns this fact there is decreased 
incentive salience associated with the response lever-the animal 
stops responding to it-when dopamine levels are above about 300% 
normal. The gradual extinction of the tendency to respond before 
the last injection has been metabolized suggests a model of cycles of 
incentive motivation (induced by the priming effects of the last injec-
tion) and satiety (induced by d-amphetamine concentrations above 
0.2 g/ml of blood or dopamine concentrations higher than 300% of 
normal). 
What is the mechanism by which drug intake becomes regu-
lated? Our examination of the progression from investigatory lever 
pressing to regulated lever pressing within binges of limited-access 
drug self-administration suggest an incentive motivational view 
rather than a drive interpretation. It is clearly the place cues in the en-
vironment that are the determinants of the left turn or the right turn 
that takes the animal to the lever. It is clearly the spatially localized 
lever, not the spatially ambiguous drug, that the animal approaches. 
Once the animal is away from the lever, it is only environmental 
cues that give information as to which way to turn. The behavior 
is clearly dependent in some way or another on a correlate of drug 
concentration in the body. Our working hypothesis is that dopamine 
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levels influence behavior as occasion-setters, not as eliciting stimuli, 
determining on a moment-to-moment basis the incentive salience-
the drawing power-of the lever. 
In this view, drug-associated environmental stimuli have max-
imum incentive salience when dopamine levels are somewhere be-
tween normal and twice normal. Elevating dopamine levels by giv-
ing a priming injection will increase the probability that the animal 
in a lever-pressing task will notice, approach, and manipulate the 
lever. In a two-lever task, the words of Bolles (1975), slightly mod-
ified, best illustrate the point: when the rat with slightly elevated 
dopamine levels happens to look to the "inactive" lever side, nothing 
happens; but when it happens to look to the "active" lever side, it 
gets excited; thus it is more likely to notice the active lever, approach 
it, and press it. When it does so, the drug will serve as a reinforcer 
just as food does when the animal is food deprived. However, when 
the dopamine level is elevated, the animal is unresponsive to the 
active lever, unmoved by it just as is the sated animal that looks at a 
food-associated lever. Now, the dopamine level is out of the optimal 
range and does not serve as an occasion-setter. Should the animal 
occasionally press the lever in this condition the drug injection and its 
associated dopamine bolus will not be reinforcing. High dopamine 
levels signal to the investigator, and presumably to the animal, that 
while another drug injection may prolong the rewarding effects of the 
previous injection, the second injection will not intensify the reward 
resulting from the previous injection, and will thus not serve as an 
effective reinforcer; high dopamine levels reduce the incentive value 
of the drug-associated cues so that the animal learns to no longer 
respond. 
Dysregulation of Intake 
If drug intake is maintained for prolonged periods at high doses, the 
apparent regulation that is typical of limited access experiments de-
teriorates. The point of dysregulation suggests yet another transition 
in the etiology of addiction that should be associated with neuroad-
aptations of one sort or another, and in this case neuroadaptations in 
the brain mechanisms of drug reward are suggested. Animals given 
unlimited access to intravenous cocaine or amphetamine come to 
take the drugs erratically and to the point of death (Bozarth & Wise, 
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1985; Johanson et al., 1976). The most obvious result is weight loss; 
most deaths occur when the animals approach death by starvation 
(Bozarth & Wise, 1985). Loss of sleep is also evident. In the initial 
opportunity for unlimited drug access, the animals frequently re-
spond regularly for one to three days without interruption (Pickens 
& Harris, 1968). The behavior then becomes sporadic, with binges 
and abstinence periods of irregular length (Pickens & Harris, 1968) 
that give the appearance of periodicity to group averages (Bozarth & 
Wise, 1985). If, instead of continuous drug access, animals are given 
intermittent access in long (6 hour or longer) sessions, dysregulation 
can take another form. In such circumstances the animals tend to 
respond more and more strongly during the initial, "loading," phase 
of each session (prior to establishing the elevated drug or transmitter 
levels that provide regulatory feedback), thus increasing their total 
drug intake for each session (Ahmed & Koob, 1998). The fact that the 
animals return to escalated intake even after long periods of with-
drawal is reminiscent of the way that obese humans, once they have 
undergone a period of overfeeding, tend to return to a pattern of 
excess following periods of diet and weight loss (Levin, 2000). The 
degree to which these dysregulations depend on known neuroadap-
tations is unclear, however. The irregular intake that develops after 
prolonged continuous intoxication (Bozarth & Wise, 1985; Tornatzky 
& Miczek, 2000) is associated with a dosing regimen that should be 
associated with the development of drug tolerance (Emmett-Oglesby 
& Lane, 1992; Li, Depoortere, & Emmett-Oglesby, 1994), whereas the 
escalated early intake that develops after repeated periodic intoxica-
tion is associated with a regimen associated with drug sensitization 
or "reverse tolerance" (Downs & Eddy, 1932; Kilbey & Ellinwood, 
1977; Segal & Mandell, 1974). Thus the two forms of dysregulation 
are probable consequences of independent mechanisms and opposite 
neuroadaptations. 
Contrasts between Sensed and Unsensed Incentives 
What unique insights can be gained from comparing the motivations 
for sensed and unsensed rewarding incentives? Perhaps the most 
obvious has to do with the role of learning in the control of behavior 
by sensed incentives. In the case of drug reward and brain stimu-
lation reward, the sensed incentives are the cues and manipulanda 
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that have learned motivational significance and cue value and are 
the objects of attention at or just prior to the time of drug delivery. 
In these cases the click of the relay or the flash of the cue light is 
the sensory message of receipt of reward. Similarly, in a well-trained 
animal the click of the latch on the door hiding the food may simply 
be the sound of receipt of reward. Consider the person who wins 
a lottery: Is not the moment of the receipt of reward-the moment 
of celebration, of motivational excitation-the moment the winning 
number is announced? Don't the subsequent events of the receiving 
of the check, the cashing of the check, the trading of the cash for food, 
and the eating of the food constitute progressively weaker rewarding 
events than the first message announcing the inevitability of reward? 
Separating the motivational importance of the sensory information 
that predicts reward from the sensory information that constitutes 
reward is not so straightforward as might first be assumed. 
Another important insight is that in addition to behavior con-
trolled by drugs or brain stimulation, behavior controlled by rewards 
of sweet taste or oral cooling can become compulsive. In the case of 
air-licking or compulsive saccharin drinking there seems no obvi-
ous reason to invoke neuroadaptations or brain disease to explain 
compulsive behavior. It seems self-evident that the variety of com-
pulsive behaviors forms a continuum, differing more in degree than 
in kind, and from this perspective it seems more heuristic to look for 
commonalities between the habits established by various incentives 
than to look for unique properties that set addiction, for example, 
apart from the rest. Inasmuch as drug seeking and food seeking 
appear to be controlled by the same motivational substrates (see, 
e.g., Ettenberg & Camp, 1986; Wise, 1982), it might well prove to 
be the case that drug-induced brain pathology is a consequence, 
rather than the precipitating cause, of compulsive behavior. It seems 
unlikely that brain pathology plays a significant role in the variety 
of nondrug compulsions-such as compulsive self-stimulation-that 
accompany a wide range of motivated behaviors. 
Note 
1. I use here a metaphor from C. R. Gallistel, likening the attraction of 
an incentive to the seductive come-hither songs of the sea nymphs of Greek 
and Roman myth. The idea is that each object in the animal's environment 
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has a degree of allure that sometimes exceeds and sometimes fails to exceed 
the animal's threshold for approach responses. A given drive state is seen to 
increase the probability that an individual is responsive to the appropriate 
incentive stimuli, enhancing their allure (their salience as attractants). 
References 
Acquas, E., Carboni, E., Leone, P., & Di Chiara, G. (1989). SCH 23390 blocks 
drug-conditioned place-preferences and place aversion: Anhedonia (lack 
of reward) or apathy (lack of motivation) after dopamine-receptor block-
ade? Psychopharmacology, 99, 151-155. 
Ahmed, S. H., & Koob, G. F. (1998). Transition from moderate to excessive 
drug intake: Change in hedonic set point. Science, 282, 298-300. 
Barnes, J. (Ed.). (1984). The complete works of Aristotle (Vol. 1). Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press. 
Beach, F. A (1956). Characteristics of masculine "sex drive." In M. R. Jones 
(Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation (pp. 1-32). Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press. 
Bechara, A, Nader, K., & van der Kooy, D. (1995). Neurobiology of with-
drawal motivation: Evidence for two separate aversive effects produced 
in morphine-naive versus morphine-dependent rats by both naloxone 
and spontaneous withdrawal. Behavioral Neuroscience, 109, 91-105. 
Beck, R. C. (1978). Motivation. New York: Prentice-Hall. 
Beitner-Johnson, D., Guitart, X., & Nestler, E. J. (1992). Neurofilament pro-
teins and the meso limbic dopamine system: Common regulation by 
chronic morphine and chronic cocaine in the rat ventral tegmental area. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 12,2165-2176. 
Beitner-Johnson, D., & Nestler, E. J. (1991). Morphine and cocaine exert com-
mon chronic actions on tyrosine hydroxylase in dopaminergic brain re-
ward regions. Journal of Neurochemistry, 57, 344-347. 
Berhow, M., Russell, D. S., Terwilliger, R. Z., Beitner-Johnson, D., Self, D. S., 
Lindsay, R. M., et al. (1995). Influence of neurotrophic factors on mor-
phine- and cocaine-induced biochemical changes in the mesolimbic dopa-
mine system. Neuroscience, 68,969-979. 
Berke, J. D., & Hyman, S. E. (2000). Addiction, dopamine, and the molecular 
mechanisms of memory. Neuron, 25, 515-532. 
Bindra, D. (1974). A motivational view of learning, performance, and behav-
ior modification. Psychological Review, 81, 199-213. 
Bolles, R. C. (1975). Theory of motivation (2nd ed.). New York: Harper and 
Row. 
Bczarth, M. A, & Wise, R. A (1985). Toxicity associated with long-term 
intravenous heroin and cocaine self-administration in the rat. Journal of 
the American Medical Association, 254, 81-83. 
Bozarth, M. A., & Wise, R. A (1986). Involvement of the ventral tegmental 
dopamine system in opioid and psychomotor stimulant reinforcement. In 
188 
MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS IN THE ETIOLOGY OF DRUG ABUSE 
L. S. Harris (Ed.), Problems of drug dependence 1985 (Vol. 67, pp. 190-196). 
Washington DC: U.s. Government Printing Office. 
Brauer, L. H., & de Wit, H. (1997). High dose pimozide does not block am-
phetamine-induced euphoria in normal volunteers. Pharmacology 
Biochemistry and Behavior, 56, 265-272. 
Brown, J. S. (1953). Problems presented by the concept of acquired drives. 
In M. R. Jones (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation (pp. 1-21). Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press. 
Cabanac, M. (1971). Physiological role of pleasure. Science, 173, 1103-1107. 
Cappell, H., & LeBlanc, A E. (1971). Conditioned aversion to saccharin by 
single administrations of mescaline and d-amphetamine. Psychopharma-
cologia, 22, 352-356. 
Cappell, H., LeBlanc, A E., & Endrenyi, L. (1973). Aversive conditioning by 
psychoactive drugs: Effects of morphine, alcohol and chlordiazepoxide. 
Psychopharmacologia, 29, 239-246. 
Carlezon, W. A L Thome, L Olson, V. G., Lane-Ladd, S. B., Brodkin, E. S., 
Hiroi, N., et al. (1998). Regulation of cocaine reward by CREB. Science, 282, 
2272-2275. 
Carlson, K. R. (1977). Supersensitivity to apomorphine and stress two years 
after chronic methadone treatment. Neuropharmacology, 16, 795-798. 
Changizi, M. A, McGehee, R. M., & Hall, W. G. (2002). Evidence that appet-
itive responses for dehydration and food-deprivation are learned. Physi-
ology and Behavior, 75,295-304. 
Chein, 1., Gerard, D. L., Lee, R. S., & Rosenfeld, E. (1964). The road to H: 
Narcotics, delinquency, and social policy. New York: Basic Books. 
Craig, W. (1918). Appetites and aversions as constituents of instincts. Biolog-
ical Bulletin, 34, 91-107. 
Dackis, C. A., & Gold, M. S. (1985). New concepts in cocaine addiction: The 
dopamine depletion hypothesis. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 9, 
469-477. 
Darwin, C. (1859). On the origin of species. London: John Murray. 
Deneau, G., Yanagita, T., & Seevers, M. H. (1969). Self-administration of psy-
choactive substances by the monkey: A measure of psychological depen-
dence. Psychopharmacologia, 16,30-48. 
de Wit, H., & Stewart, J. (1981). Reinstatement of cocaine-reinforced respond-
ing in the rat. Psychopharmacology, 75, 134-143. 
de Wit, H., & Stewart, J. (1983). Drug reinstatement of heroin-reinforced 
responding in the rat. Psychopharmacology, 79, 29-31. 
de Wit, H., & Wise, R. A. (1977). Blockade of cocaine reinforcement in rats 
with the dopamine receptor blocker pimozide, but not with the noradren-
ergic blockers phentolamine or phenoxybenzamine. Canadian Journal of 
Psychology, 31, 195-203. 
Downs, A w., & Eddy, N. B. (1932). The effect of repeated doses of cocaine 
on the dog. Journal of Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics, 46, 195-
198. 
189 
Drive, Incentive, and Reinforcement 
Emmett-Oglesby, M. w., & Lane, J. D. (1992). Tolerance to the reinforcing 
effects of cocaine. Behavioural Pharmacology, 3, 193-200. 
Epstein, AN. (1973). Epilogue: Retrospect and prognosis. In A N. Epstein, 
H. R Kissileff, & E. Stellar (Eds.), The neuropsychology of thirst: New findings 
and advances in concepts (pp. 315-332). Washington: Winston. 
Ettenberg, A, & Camp, C. H. (1986). Haloperidol induces a partial reinforce-
ment extinction effect in rats: Implications for a dopamine involvement 
in food reward. Pharmacology Biochemistry and Behavior, 25, 813-82l. 
Ettenberg, A, & Geist, T. D. (1991). Animal model for investigating the anx-
iogenic effects of self-administered cocaine. Psychopharmacology, 103,455-
46l. 
Fiske, D. w., & Maddi, S. R (Eds.). (1961). Functions of varied experience. 
Homewood IL: Dorsey. 
Fitzsimons, J. T. (1972). Thirst. Physiological Reviews, 52, 468-56l. 
Frank, R A., Martz, S., & Pommering, T. (1988). The effect of chronic cocaine 
on self-stimulation train-duration thresholds. Pharmacology Biochemistry 
and Behavior, 29, 755-758. 
Freed, W. J., & Mendelson,I. (1974). Airlicking: Thirsty rats prefer a warm dry 
airstream to a warm humid airstream. Physiology and Behavior, 12, 557-56l. 
Gallistel, C. R, Stellar, J. R, & Bubis, E. (1974). Parametric analysis of brain 
stimulation reward in the rat: 1. The transient process and the memory-
containing process. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 87, 
848-859. 
Gerber, G. L Bozarth, M. A, Spindler, L & Wise, R A (1985). Concurrent 
heroin self-administration and intracranial self-stimulation in rats. Phar-
macology Biochemistry and Behavior, 23, 837-842. 
Gerber, G. J., & Stretch, R (1975). Drug-induced reinstatement of extingUish-
ed self-administration behavior in monkeys. Pharmacology Biochemistry 
and Behavior, 3, 1055-106l. 
Gerber, G. L & Wise, R A (1989). Pharmacological regulation of intravenous 
cocaine and heroin self- administration in rats: A variable dose paradigm. 
Pharmacology Biochemistry and Behavior, 32, 527-53l. 
Glickman, S. E., & Schiff, B. B. (1967). A biological theory of reinforcement. 
Psychological Review, 74,81-109. 
Gunne, L. M., Anggard, E., & Jonsson, L. E. (1972). Clinical trials with am-
phetamine-blocking drugs. Psychiatria Neurologia Neurochirurgia, 75, 225-
226. 
Haertzen, C. A (1966). Development of scales based on patterns of drug 
effects, using the Addiction Research Center Inventory. Psychological Re-
ports, 18, 163-194. 
Harlow, H. F. (1953). Mice, monkeys, men and motives. Psychological Review, 
60,23-32. 
Hebb, D. O. (1949). The organization of behavior. New York: Wiley. 
Hebb, D. O. (1955). Drives and the C.NS (conceptual nervous system). Psy-
chological Review, 62, 243-254. 
190 
MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS IN THE ETIOLOGY OF DRUG ABUSE 
Hetherington, M. (Ed.). (2001). Food cravings and addiction. London: Leather-
head Press. 
Hinde, R. A (1960). Energy models of motivation. Symposia of the Society for 
Experimental Biology, 14, 199-213. 
Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles of behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
Iglauer, c., Llewellyn, M. E., & Woods, J. H. (1976). Concurrent schedules 
of cocaine injection in rhesus monkeys: Dose variations under indepen-
dent and non-independent variable-interval procedures. Pharmacological 
Reviews, 27, 367-383. 
Jacobs, H. L., & Sharma, K. N. (1969). Taste versus calories: Sensory and 
metabolic signals in the control of food intake. Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences, 157, 1084-1125. 
Jaffe, J. H. (1985). Drug addiction and drug abuse. In A G. Gilman, L. S. 
Goodman, & A Gilman (Eds.), The pharmacological basis of therapeutics (pp. 
532-581). New York: Macmillan. 
Johanson, C. E., Balster, R. L., & Bonese, K. (1976). Self-administration of psy-
chomotor stimulant drugs: The effects of unlimited access. Pharmacology 
Biochemistry and Behavior, 4, 45-51. 
Johanson, I. B., & Hall, W. G. (1979). Appetitive learning in I-day-old rat 
pups. Science, 205, 419-421. 
Jones, M. R. (1955). Introduction. In M. R. Jones (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on 
motivation (p. vii). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
Jonsson, L., Anggard, E., & Gunne, L. (1971). Blockade of intravenous am-
phetamine euphoria in man. Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics, 12, 
889-896. 
Kalant, H. (1977). Comparative aspects of tolerance to, and dependence on, 
alcohol, barbiturates, and opiates. In M. M. Gross (Ed.), Alcohol intoxication 
and withdrawal (pp. 169-186). New York: Plenum. 
Kelleher, R. T., & Morse, W. H. (1968). Schedules using noxious stimuli. 3. 
Responding maintained with response produced electric shocks. Journal 
of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 11, 819-838. 
Kelz, M. B., Chen, L Carlezon, W. A, Whisler, K., Gilden, L., Bechmann, A 
M., et aI. (1999). Expression of the transcription factor FosB in the brain 
controls sensitivity to cocaine. Nature, 401, 272-276. 
Kilbey, M. M., & Ellinwood, E. H., Jr. (1977). Reverse tolerance to stimulant-
induced abnormal behavior. Life Sciences, 20,1063-1076. 
Kissileff, H. R. (1969). Food-associated drinking in the rat. Journal of Com par-
ative and Physiological Psychology, 67, 284-300. 
Kokkinidis, L., Zacharko, R. M., & Predy, P. A. (1980). Post-amphetamine 
depression of self-stimulation responding from the substantia nigra: Re-
versal by tricyclic antidepressants. Pharmacology Biochemistry and Behavior, 
13, 379-383. 
Koob, G. F. (1996). Drug addiction: The yin and yang of hedonic homeostasis. 
Neuron, 16, 893-896. 
Koob, G. F., Stinus, L., Le Moal, M., & Bloom, F. E. (1989). Opponent process 
191 
Drive, Incentive, and Reinforcement 
theory of motivation: Neurobiological evidence from studies of opiate 
dependence. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 13, 135-140. 
Lehrman, D. S. (1965). Interaction between internal and external environ-
ments in the regulation of the reproductive cycle of the ring dove. In F. A 
Beach (Ed.), Sex and behavior. New York: Wiley. 
Leith, N. J., & Barrett, R. J. (1976). Amphetamine and the reward system: 
Evidence for tolerance and post-drug depression. Psychopharmacologia, 46, 
19-25. 
Le Magnen, J. (1959). Effets des administrations post-prandiales de glucose 
sur l'etablissement des appetits. Comptes rendus des seances de la Societe de 
biologie et de ses jiliales, 158,212-215. 
Le Magnen, J. (1969). Peripheral and systemic actions of food in the caloric 
regulation of intake. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 157, 1127-
1157. 
Leshner, A I. (1997). Addiction is a brain disease, and it matters. Science, 278, 
45-47. 
Levin, B. (2000). Metabolic imprinting on genetically predisposed neural 
circuits perpetuates obesity. Nutrition, 16, 909-915. 
Li, D. H., Depoortere, R. Y., & Emmett-Oglesby, M. W. (1994). Tolerance to the 
reinforcing effects of cocaine in a progressive ratio paradigm. Psychophar-
macology, 116,326-332. 
Lyness, W. H., Friedle, N. M., & Moore, K. E. (1979). Destruction of dopamin-
ergic nerve terminals in nucleus accumbens: effect on d-amphetamine 
self-administration. Pharmacology Biochemistry and Behavior, 11, 553-556. 
Malmo, R. B. (1975). On emotions, needs, and our archaic brain. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston. 
Manzardo, A M., Del Rio, J. A, Stein, L., & Belluzzi, J. D. (2001). Rats choose 
cocaine over dopamine agonists in a two-lever self-administration pref-
erence test. Pharmacology Biochemistry and Behavior, 70, 257-265. 
Markou, A, & Koob, G. F. (1991). Postcocaine anhedonia: An animal model 
of cocaine withdrawal. Neuropsychopharmacology, 4, 17-26. 
McAuliffe, W. E., & Gordon, R. A (1974). A test of Lindesmith's theory of 
addiction: The frequency of euphoria among long-term addicts. American 
Journal of Sociology, 79,795-840. 
McAuliffe, W. E., & Gordon, R. A (1980). Reinforcement and the combina-
tion of effects: Summary of a theory of opiate addiction. In D. J. Lettieri, 
M. Sayers, & H. W. Pearson (Eds.), Theories of drug abuse (pp. 137-141). 
Washington DC: National Institute on Drug Abuse. 
McLellan, A T., Lewis, D. c., O'Brien, C. P., & Kleber, H. D. (2000). Drug 
dependence, a chronic medical illness: Implications for treatment, insur-
ance, and outcomes evaluation. Journal of the American Medical Association, 
284,1689-1695. 
Mendelson, J., & Chillag, D. (1970). Tongue cooling: Anew reward for thirsty 
rodents. Science, 170, 1418-1421. 
Morgan, M. J. (1974). Resistance to satiation. Animal Behaviour, 22, 449-466. 
192 
MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS IN THE ETIOLOGY OF DRUG ABUSE 
Myers, K. P., & Sclafani, A. (2001a). Conditioned enhancement of flavor 
evaluation reinforced by intragastric glucose. II. Taste reactivity analysis. 
Physiology and Behavior, 74,495-505. 
Myers, K. P., & Sclafani, A. (2001b). Conditioned enhancement of flavor eval-
uation reinforced by intragastric glucose: 1. Intake acceptance and prefer-
ence analysis. Physiology and Behavior, 74, 481-493. 
Nestler, E. J. (1992). Molecular mechanisms of drug addiction. Journal ofNeu-
roscience, 12,2439-2450. 
Nestler, E. J. (2001). Molecular basis of long-term plasticity underlying ad-
diction. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2,119-128. 
Nestler, E. J., & Aghajanian, G. K. (1997). Molecular and cellular basis of 
addiction. Science, 278, 58-63. 
Olds, J. (1956). Pleasure centers in the brain. Scientific American, 195, 105-116. 
Pavlov, 1. P. (1928). Lectures on conditioned reflexes. New York: International 
Publishers. 
Petri, H. L. (1981). Motivation theory and research. Belmont CA: Wadsworth. 
Pickens, R, & Harris, W. C. (1968). Self-administration of d-amphetamine by 
rats. Psychopharmacologia, 12, 158-163. 
Pickens, R W., & Johanson, C. E. (1992). Craving: Consensus of status and 
agenda for future research. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 30,127-131. 
Ramsauer, S., Mendelson, J., & Freed, W. J. (1974). Effects of water tem-
perature on the reward value and satiating capacity of water in water-
deprived rats. Behavioral Biology, 11, 381-393. 
Ranaldi, R, Pocock, D., Zereik, R, & Wise, R A. (1999). Dopamine fluc-
tuations in the nucleus accumbens during maintenance, extinction, and 
reinstatement of intravenous D-amphetamine self-administration. Journal 
of Neuroscience, 19, 4102-4109. 
Risner, M. E., & Jones, B. E. (1976). Role of noradrenergic and dopaminergic 
processes in amphetamine self-administration. Pharmacology Biochemistry 
and Behavior, 5, 477-482. 
Roberts, D. C. S., Corcoran, M. E., & Fibiger, H. C. (1977). On the role of 
ascending catecholaminergic systems in intravenous self-administration 
of cocaine. Pharmacology Biochemistry and Behavior, 6, 615-620. 
Robinson, T. E., & Berridge, K. C. (1993). The neural basis of drug craving: 
An incentive-sensitization theory of addiction. Brain Research Reviews, 18, 
247-292. 
Robinson, T. E., & Berridge, K. C. (2000). The psychology and neurobiology 
of addiction: An incentive-sensitization view. Addiction(Suppl. 2), S91-
S117. 
Robinson, T. E., & Berridge, K. C. (2001). Incentive-sensitization and addic-
tion. Addiction, 96, 103-114. 
Robinson, T. E., Gorny, G., Mitton, E., & Kolb, B. (2001). Cocaine self-adminis-
tration alters the morphology of dendrites and dendritic spines in the 
nucleus accumbens and neocortex. Synapse, 39, 257-266. 
Robinson, T. E., & Kolb, B. (1997). Persistent structural modifications in nu-
193 
Drive, Incentive, and Reinforcement 
cleus accumbens and prefrontal cortex neurons produced by previous 
experience with amphetamine. Journal of Neuroscience, 17,8491-8497. 
Robinson, T. E., & Kolb, B. (1999). Morphine alters the structure of neurons 
in the nucleus accumbens and neocortex of rats. Synapse, 33, 160-162. 
Rossetti, Z. L., Lai, M., Hmaidan, Y., & Gessa, G. L. (1993). Depletion of 
mesolimbic dopamine during behavioral despair: Partial reversal by 
chronic imipramine. European Journal of Pharmacology, 242, 313-315. 
Schmidt, C. J. (1987). Neurotoxicity of the psychedelic amphetamine, meth-
ylenedioxymethamphetamine. Journal of Pharmacology and Experimental 
Therapeutics, 240, 1-7. 
Schneirla, T. C. (1939). A theoretical consideration of the basis for approach-
withdrawal adjustments in behavior. Psychological Bulletin, 37, 501-502. 
Schneirla, T. C. (1959). An evolutionary and developmental theory of bipha-
sic processes underlying approach and withdrawaL In M. R. Jones (Ed.), 
Nebraska symposium on motivation (pp. 1-42). Lincoln: University of Ne-
braska Press. 
Segal, D. S., & Mandell, A. J. (1974). Long-term administration of d-amphet-
amine: Progressive augmentation of motor activity and stereotypy. Phar-
macology Biochemistry and Behavior, 2, 249-255. 
Sheffield, F. D., & Roby, T. B. (1950). Reward value of a non-nutritive sweet 
taste. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 43, 471-48l. 
Sherrington, C. S. (1906). The integrative action of the nervous system. New 
Haven CT: Yale University Press. 
Simon, D., & Burns, E. (1997). The corner: A year in the life of an inner-city 
neighborhood. New York: Broadway Books. 
Skinner, B. F. (1931). The concept of the reflex in the description of behavior. 
Journal of General Psychology,S, 427-458. 
Skinner, B. F. (1932). On the rate of formation of a conditioned reflex. Journal 
of Gcneral Psychology, 7,274-286. 
Skinner, B. F. (1966). The phylogeny and ontogeny of behavior: Contingen-
cies of reinforcement throw light on contingencies of survival in the evo-
lution of behavior. Science, 153,1205-1213. 
Smith, G. P. (1982). Satiety and the problem of motivation. In D. W. Pfaff 
(Ed.), The physiological mechanisms of motivation (pp. 133-143). New York: 
Springer-Ver lag. 
Smith, G. P., & Gibbs, J. (1994). Satiating effect of cholecystokinin. Annals of 
the New York Academy of Sciences, 713, 236-24l. 
Sokolov, Y. N. (1963). Perception and the conditioned reflex. Oxford: Pergamon. 
Solomon, R L., & Corbit, J. D. (1973). An opponent-process theory of moti-
vation: II. Cigarette addiction. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 81, 158-17l. 
Solomon, R L., & Corbit, J. D. (1974). An opponent-process theory of moti-
vation: 1. Temporal dynamics of affect. Psychological Rcview, 81, 119-145. 
Spence, K. W. (1956). Behavior theory and conditioning. New Haven CT: Yale 
University Press. 
Stretch, R, & Gerber, G. J. (1973). Drug-induced reinstatement of amphet-
194 
MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS IN THE ETIOLOGY OF DRUG ABUSE 
amine self-administration behaviour in monkeys. Canadian Journal of Psy-
chology, 27,168-177. 
Stewart, L de Wit, H., & Eikelboom, R (1984). Role of unconditioned and 
conditioned drug effects in the self-administration of opiates and stimu-
lants. Psychological Review, 91, 251-268. 
Teitelbaum, P. (1966). The use of operant methods in the assessment and 
control of motivational states. In W. K. Honig (Ed.), Operant behaviour: Ar-
eas of research and application (pp. 565-608). New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts. 
Thorndike, E. L. (1898). Animal intelligence: An experimental study of the 
associative processes in animals. Psychological Monographs, 8, 1-109. 
Tiffany, S. T. (1990). A cognitive model of drug urges and drug-use behavior: 
Role of automatic and nonautomatic processes. Psychological Review, 97, 
147-168. 
Toates, F (1986). Motivational systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Tornatzky, W., & Miczek, K. (2000). Cocaine self-administration "binges": 
Transition from behavioral and autonomic regulation toward hymeostatic 
dysregulation in rats. Psychopharmacology, 148, 289-298. 
Tsibulsky, V. L., & Norman, A B. (1999). Satiety threshold: A quantitative 
model of maintained cocaine self-administration. Brain Research, 839, 85-
93. 
Wagner, G. c., Ricaurte, G. A., Seiden, L. S., Schuster, C. R, Miller, R L & 
Westley, L. (1980). Long-lasting depletion of striatal dopamine and loss 
of dopamine uptake sites following repeated administration of metham-
phetamine. Brain Research, 181, 151-160. 
Wei, E. T., Tseng, L. F, Loh, H. H., & Way, E. L. (1974). Similarity of mor-
phine abstinence signs to thermoregulatory behaviour. Nature, 247, 398-
399. 
White, F L & Kalivas, P. W. (1998). Neuroadaptations involved in amphet-
amine and cocaine addiction. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 51, 141-153. 
Wise, R A (1982). Neuroleptics and operant behavior: The anhedonia hy-
pothesis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 5, 39-87. 
Wise, R A. (1985). The anhedonia hypothesis: Mark III. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 8,178-186. 
Wise, R A (1987). The role of reward pathways in the development of drug 
dependence. Pharmacology and Therapeutics, 35, 227-263. 
Wise, R A (1989). Opiate reward: Sites and substrates. Neuroscience and Biobe-
havioral Reviews, 13, 129-133. 
Wise, R A (2001). Neural circuitry of desire. In M. Hetherington (Ed.), Food 
cravings and addiction (pp. 33-58). London: Leatherhead Press. 
Wise, R A, Yokel, R A, & de Wit, H. (1976). Both positive reinforcement and 
conditioned taste aversion from amphetamine and from apomorphine in 
rats. Science, 191, 1273-1275. 
Wise, R. A., Yokel, R A, Hansson, P., & Gerber, G. J. (1977). Concurrent 
195 
Drive, Incentive, and Reinforcement 
intracranial self-stimulation and amphetamine self-administration in rats. 
Pharmacology Biochemistry and Behavior, 7,459-461. 
Wise, R A., Newton, P., Leeb, K., Burnette, B., Pocock, P., & Justice, J. B. (1995). 
Fluctuations in nucleus accumbens dopamine concentration during intra-
venous cocaine self-administration in rats. Psychopharmacology, 120, 10-
20. 
Wise, R A., Leone, P., Rivest, R, & Leeb, K. (1995). Elevations of nucleus 
accumbens dopamine and DOPAC levels during intravenous heroin self-
administration. Synapse, 21, 140-148. 
Woods, J. H. (1990). Abuse liability and the regulatory control of therapeutic 
drugs: Untested assumptions. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 25, 229-233. 
Woods, J. H., & Schuster, C. R (1971). Opiates as reinforcing stimuli. In T. 
Thompson, & R Pickens (Eds.), Stimulus properties of drugs (pp. 163-175). 
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
Woodworth, R S. (1918). Dynamic psychology. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press. 
Yokel, R A. (1987). Intravenous self-administration: Response rates, the ef-
fects of pharmacological challenges, and drug preferences. In M. A. Bo-
zarth (Ed.), Methods of assessing the reinforcing properties of abused drugs (pp. 
1-33). New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Yokel, R A., & Pickens, R (1973). Self-administration of optical isomers of 
amphetamine and methylamphetamine by rats. Journal of Pharmacology 
and Experimental Therapeutics, 187, 27-33. 
Yokel, R A., & Pickens, R (1974). Drug level of d- and I-amphetamine during 
intravenous self-administration. Psychopharmacologia, 34, 255-264. 
Yokel, R A., & Wise, R A. (1975). Increased lever pressing for amphetamine 
after pimozide in rats: Implications for a dopamine theory of reward. 
Science, 187,547-549. 
Yokel, R A., & Wise, R A. (1976). Attenuation of intravenous amphetamine 
reinforcement by central dopamine blockade in rats. Psychopharmacology, 
48,311-318. 
Young, P. T. (1949). Emotion as disorganized response-a reply to Professor 
Leeper. Psychological Review, 56,184-191. 
